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cessfully developed an advanced experimental jet aircraft, but the very committee which has to approve the appropriation required for the development of that aircraft knows nothing about it?

So we have come full circle to the point at which the question is not merely one of the Defense Department withholding news, coloring news, or releasing it at a time which is advantageous to the Defense Department and to the administration. We have come to the point at which most of the members of the committee who have to deal with the questions involved were surprised when the announcement was made because they had no previous knowledge of the development in any manner.

To put the subject in its proper context, I should like to point out that the two persons in my office who work with me on these subjects have the highest clearances for secrecy that can be procured. Yet those persons themselves cannot attend meetings of the appropriations subcommittee because the proceedings are so highly classified. In such an atmosphere we did not learn about, nor are we able to procure information—I suppose we can now since the world knows about it—as to such a weapon, such an aircraft, or where the money came from.

What we have seen demonstrates a thing which I have been saying repeatedly. It is high time that the Congress of the United States took the reins of our Government back into its own hands.

One way in which it can do so is by controlling the appropriations. If information is withheld from us, and if we are not given the full and complete picture, we certainly cannot by any means control appropriations or control such items as the A-11, which apparently has now been successfully developed.

I ask unanimous consent that I may include in the Record an article which has been furnished to me by the Aviation Daily. It gives a report, with full details, on the A-11. I am greatly indebted to the Aviation Daily for giving me more information on the A-11 than I could receive as a member of the Subcommittee on Defense Appropriations.

There being no objection, the article was ordered to be printed in the Record, as follows:

A-11 TESTED FOR IMI ROLE; SOME DETAILS REVEALED

The Air Force's Lockheed A-11, now being tested to learn its potential as a long-range interceptor, couples 2,000-mile-per-hour speeds with probable range between 2,500 and 3,000 miles, Washington observers estimated yesterday. Pictures of the aircraft indicated it is longer than either the F-105 (64 feet, 3 inches) or the F-4 Phantom II (58 feet, 3 inches). Best indications are that the A-11 is between 75 and 80 feet long and apparently a two-seater aircraft.

The two engines, mounted well aft in the wing on either side of the fuselage, are Pratt & Whitney J-58's with afterburners. Usually authoritative engine indices describe the J-58 as 18 feet, 9 inches long and weighing more than 7,000 pounds. One military version with a nine-stage compressor and a long convergent-divergent afterburner, is rated at 32,000 pounds thrust. The engine installation shows a nacelle or inlet, plus exhaust ducting nearly twice the reported

length of the engine. A spike configuration at the inlet end of the J-58 powerplant is adjustable to control air flow to avoid undesirable turbulence in the intake area.

Twin vertical stabilizers are balanced by a ventral fin shown in inflight photographs. This underside fin is absent in pictures of the A-11 on the ground, with its tricycle landing gear on the runway. Whether the lower fin is jettisoned in flight (as with the X-15) or retracted like landing gear, is not apparent and no details have been given by either Lockheed or the Air Force. Nor was any explanation given for long, slim cigar-shaped pods, 6 to 8 feet long, suspended from the aircraft on outswep pylons, just aft of the engine inlet ducts.

President Johnson's announcement of the existence of 11 or 12 A-11 test aircraft at a press conference last Saturday gave rise to almost more questions than it answered.

Members of the Senate Armed Services Committee were not briefed or informed as a group of the A-11's existence—but some individual members were told about the aircraft, presumably by officials from DOD or elsewhere in the administration.

Such officers as Air Force Chief of Staff Gen. Curtis LeMay, SAC's General Power, and AFSC's General Schriever have all gone on record within the past 6 months making strong pleas for both an advanced manned bomber and an improved manned interceptor (IMI). Since it is highly unlikely they were unaware of the A-11's existence, there is the obvious possibility that all three (plus many other informed officers, including members of the Joint Chiefs of Staff), may have been dissembling, merely playing a part, to keep knowledge of the new aircraft from the public.

Only indications that there was a new, undiscussed aircraft in development were recurring hints that the Pratt & Whitney J-58 development was going forward with full development funding, the type of support accorded only to a major systems effort. Other indications that the "skunk works" at a Lockheed Pacific coast facility was working on a top-secret project were banded about from time to time, but there was no specific indication that a new airplane was being tested until observers near Edwards Air Force Base persisted in reporting that the XB-70 was being flown. These two aircraft may appear much alike in high-altitude flight and mistaking the A-11 for the XB-70 is viewed in some quarters as an indication that both planes have somewhat similar delta-wing configurations. F-104 pilots flying near Edwards have reported seeing a strange aircraft which "took off like a bat out of hell" when they attempted to close with it for a closer look.

Some western engineers and observers feel that, in the A-11, Lockheed has apparently solved the center-of-gravity problem encountered in designing aircraft for supersonic speeds. In the B-58, the desired center of gravity is maintained at mach 2 speeds by pumping fuel into the tail. Concorde SST designers have apparently also been confronted with a similar center-of-gravity problem. Information available on the A-11 indicates it achieves zero trim drag at mach 3, eliminating necessity for fuel management devices to maintain the proper center of gravity during transition to supersonic speeds and during supersonic cruise.

The speeds claimed for the A-11, which make it the world's fastest known jet-powered aircraft, plus the thrust generated—apparently on the order of 64,000 pounds—combined with an operating altitude of "more than 70,000 feet," seem to spell out characteristics that would permit a payload that will make the airplane an effective fighter-bomber. This would be in contrast to the Lockheed U-2, which was configured for maximum endurance at altitude at the expense of high speeds of large payloads. Much military and industry speculation

about J58 development assured that the engine was being built to power a successor to the U-2—but probably an airplane with inferior fuel economy compared to this strictly reconnaissance type.

An authoritative Government source noted that FAA officials, major airframe manufacturers with a need to know and, specifically, people in and out of Government connected with SST development, were briefed in the last 2 months about the A-11, its use of titanium, and its potential contributions to SST technology. The source also indicated that DOD judgment in rejecting Boeing's TFX proposal on the basis of its proposed use of the metal was based on knowledge of titanium technology derived from the A-11 development program. No explanation was given for not giving Boeing the titanium data to which DOD had access during the competition for the TFX contract award. In terms of Boeing's rank as a major airframe manufacturer, the implication is that Boeing now shares the A-11-developed titanium information, along with a number of other U.S. airframe firms.

President Johnson identified Hughes Aircraft Co. as the developer of the "experimental fire-control and air-to-air missile systems for the A-11." Hughes was also responsible for the development of similar components for the canceled F-108 fighter. But when the F-108 program was canceled in September 1959, work was permitted to continue on the fire-control and the missile system designated GAR-9 (Falcon). Now known as the AIM-47, the Falcon system is listed by the Air Force as "still under development"—possibly with the incorporation of advancements that will see it used as the A-11 missile system. In its original concept, GAR-9 was a missile also destined for a high-speed launching platform, since the F-108 would also have been a mach 3 aircraft, which the Air Force was prepared to order in numbers exceeding a hundred.

At the time of the F-108 cancellation, a total of \$200 million had been committed to it fire control and missile systems—with \$70 million of this amount earmarked for fire control. None of this money was recovered, since the development was allowed to continue. Hughes is also developing the AIM-26, a nuclear tipped missile, and also the Phoenix missile system for Navy's version of the TFX.

A measure of the degree of secrecy surrounding the A-11 was indicated by a report reaching the Daily that industry workers associated with the program had been warned they would be "blacklisted" if caught leaking information about it.

AGRICULTURAL ACT OF 1964—THE COTTON AND WHEAT PROGRAM

The Senate resumed the consideration of the bill (H.R. 6196) to encourage increased consumption of cotton (and wheat) to maintain the income of cotton producers to provide a special research program designed to lower costs of production, and for other purposes.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The question is on agreeing to the amendments of the Senator from Texas to the amendment of the Senator from Louisiana [Mr. ELLENDER]. On that question the yeas and nays have been ordered, and the clerk will call the roll.

The legislative clerk called the roll.

Mr. PELL (after having voted in the affirmative). On this vote I have a pair with the Senator from West Virginia [Mr. RANDOLPH]. If he were present and voting, he would vote "nay." If I were at liberty to vote, I would vote "yea." Therefore, I withdraw my vote.

Mr. HUMPHREY. I announce that the Senator from New Mexico [Mr. ANDERSON], the Senator from Idaho [Mr. CHURCH], the Senator from Connecticut [Mr. DODD], and the Senator from Indiana [Mr. HARTKE] are absent on official business.

I also announce that the Senator from West Virginia [Mr. RANDOLPH] is absent because of illness.

I further announce that, if present and voting, the Senator from Connecticut [Mr. DODD] and the Senator from Idaho [Mr. CHURCH] would each vote "nay."

Mr. KUCHEL. I announce that the Senator from New Hampshire [Mr. CORTON] and the Senator from Arizona [Mr. GOLDWATER] are necessarily absent.

The result was announced—yeas 12, 80 nays, as follows:

[No. 52 Leg.]

YEAS—12

Allott	Curtis	Miller
Bartlett	Fong	Morton
Bennett	Humphrey	Simpson
Boggs	Jordan, Idaho	Tower

NAYS—80

Alken	Hill	Mundt
Bayh	Holland	Muskie
Beall	Hruska	Nelson
Bible	Inouye	Neuberger
Brewster	Jackson	Pastore
Burdick	Javits	Pearson
Byrd, Va.	Johnston	Prouty
Byrd, W. Va.	Jordan, N.C.	Proxmire
Cannon	Kesting	Ribicoff
Carlson	Kennedy	Robertson
Case	Kuchel	Russell
Clark	Lausche	Saltonstall
Cooper	Long, Mo.	Scott
Dirksen	Long, La.	Smathers
Dominick	Magnuson	Smith
Douglas	Manafield	Sparkman
Eastland	McCarthy	Stennis
Edmondson	McClellan	Symington
Ellender	McGee	Talmadge
Engle	McGovern	Thurmond
Ervin	McIntyre	Walters
Fulbright	McNamara	Williams, N.J.
Gore	Mechem	Williams, Del.
Gruening	Metcalf	Yarborough
Hart	Monroney	Young, N. Dak.
Hayden	Morse	Young, Ohio
Hickenlooper	Moss	

NOT VOTING—8

Anderson	Dodd	Pell
Church	Goldwater	Randolph
Cotton	Hartke	

So Mr. TOWER's amendments were rejected.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The question recurs on agreeing to the amendment of the Senator from Louisiana [Mr. ELLENDER] in the nature of a substitute.

Mr. ELLENDER. Mr. President, I do not expect to speak for very long but I ask the indulgence of Senators for 2 or 3 minutes.

The main purpose of my amendment is to reduce the price of cotton to 30 cents a pound. This change alone would save the Americans taxpayers \$168,750,000. The amendment, according to the estimates made by the Department of Agriculture, by the expenditure of \$56 million, would mean an increase of 800,000 bales of cotton that would be used by the textile mills of this country in contrast to an increase of a million bales under the committee bill, which would cost \$309 million.

In addition to that provision, I have another provision which would help the small producers by payments in kind on the first 10 bales of cotton produced on

each farm the difference between the 30 cents fixed in the bill and the currently prevailing support price of 32.47 cents. That would cost \$45 million. Deducted from the savings I have just mentioned, the total savings of price supports alone would then be \$123,750,000.

I hope that the Senate will vote for the substitute amendment. If it does not, it will establish a precedent whereby from here on the Government will subsidize cotton growing at a figure equal to the difference between the price support level and the world price; and I do not believe such a precedent should be established.

Mr. President, I hope that the Senate will vote for my substitute amendment.

Mr. EASTLAND. Mr. President, I do not intend to detain the Senate long. The Committee on Agriculture and Forestry has brought to the floor of the Senate the very best cotton bill possible. It has brought a bill that will bring down costs. It has brought a bill that will reduce the carryovers which now reach approximately 13 million bales. It will reduce money that the Federal Government must invest in a cotton program. It will place the industry on a sound financial basis.

I ask the Senate to stand by its committee and to stand by the cotton industry with a bill that will reestablish it on its own feet and make it a prosperous American industry.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The question is on agreeing to the amendment of the Senator from Louisiana [Mr. ELLENDER] in the nature of a substitute. On this question the yeas and nays have been ordered; and the clerk will call the roll.

The legislative clerk proceeded to call the roll.

Mr. DIRKSEN (when his name was called). Mr. President, on this vote I have a pair with the distinguished Senator from West Virginia [Mr. RANDOLPH]. If he were present and voting, he would vote "nay." If I were at liberty to vote, I would vote "yea." Therefore, I withhold my vote.

Mr. BIBLE (when his name was called). On this vote I have a pair with the Senator from Connecticut [Mr. DODD]. If he were present and voting, he would vote "nay"; if I were at liberty to vote, I would vote "yea." I therefore withhold my vote.

The roll call was concluded.

Mr. HUMPHREY. I announce that the Senator from New Mexico [Mr. ANDERSON], the Senator from Idaho [Mr. CHURCH], the Senator from Connecticut [Mr. DODD], the Senator from Indiana [Mr. HARTKE], and the Senator from Virginia [Mr. BYRD] are absent on official business.

I also announce that the Senator from West Virginia [Mr. RANDOLPH] is absent because of illness.

I further announce that, if present and voting, the Senator from Idaho [Mr. CHURCH] would vote "nay."

Mr. KUCHEL. I announce that the Senator from New Hampshire [Mr. CORTON] and the Senator from Arizona [Mr. GOLDWATER] are necessarily absent.

The result was announced—yeas 20, nays 70, as follows:

[No. 53 Leg.]

YEAS—20

Allott	Ellender	Morse
Bartlett	Fong	Morton
Bennett	Gruening	Neuberger
Boggs	Lausche	Robertson
Cannon	Manafield	Simpson
Curtis	Mechem	Williams, Del.
Dominick	Miller	

NAYS—70

Alken	Inouye	Pastore
Bayh	Jackson	Pearson
Beall	Javits	Pell
Brewster	Johnston	Prouty
Burdick	Jordan, N.C.	Proxmire
Byrd, W. Va.	Jordan, Idaho	Ribicoff
Carlson	Keating	Russell
Case	Kennedy	Saltonstall
Clark	Kuchel	Scott
Cooper	Long, Mo.	Smathers
Douglas	Long, La.	Smith
Eastland	Magnuson	Sparkman
Edmondson	McCarthy	Stennis
Engle	McClellan	Symington
Ervin	McGee	Talmadge
Fulbright	McGovern	Thurmond
Gore	McIntyre	Tower
Hart	McNamara	Walters
Hayden	Metcalf	Williams, N.J.
Hickenlooper	Monroney	Yarborough
Hill	Moss	Young, N. Dak.
Holland	Mundt	Young, Ohio
Hruska	Muskie	
Humphrey	Nelson	

NOT VOTING—10

Anderson	Cotton	Hartke
Bible	Dirksen	Randolph
Byrd, Va.	Dodd	
Church	Goldwater	

So Mr. ELLENDER's amendment was rejected.

Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, I wish to warn all Senators that the Senate will remain in session late this evening. It is anticipated that there will be further votes.

OAS, CUBA, AND A FLORIDA JUNKET

Mr. SIMPSON. Mr. President, two significant events last week serve to illustrate the continuing danger to the Western Hemisphere from Communist Cuba and the effect this menace is having on official Washington.

Last Monday a blue ribbon Investigating Committee of the Organization of American States formally charged Cuba with aggression against Venezuela. The report marks the first instance of the OAS leveling a specific charge of aggression against the Communist satellite. Needless to say, the report is of tremendous importance.

Later in the week the specter of Communist Cuba again raised its head in the form of unprecedented security precautions taken during the President's political pilgrimage to Florida. The veracity of reports that the measures were inspired by rumors of a Cuban agent's proposed suicide dive into the President's aircraft may never be verified, but as one wire service put it:

Without question the security measures imposed during Mr. Johnson's 16-hour Florida visit suggested there was official concern about the safety of the President while in the air.

Other speculation concerned the possible launching of a Cuban missile to intercept the Presidential airplane.

The elaborate steps taken to protect the President as he visited the Sunshine

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State might have indicated an inspection tour of Vietnam rather than a campaign swing through an American State 90 miles from Cuba. The President used an unmarked Air Force plane rather than his official jet transport. Press blackouts and publicity decoys drew attention from arrival and departure points. Army helicopters were employed to guard the official car, and a golf course was substituted for a landing strip during a short flight near Miami. Also, the press reports that virtually the entire top echelon of the Secret Service, including the Chief and the Head of the White House detail, accompanied the President to Florida.

I have absolutely no quarrel, Mr. President, with the efforts of the Secret Service to protect the life of this Nation's Chief Executive. The tragedy of last November dispels any doubt as to the need for caution where communism is concerned. Security precautions, however, like many other things, are relative. It is indicative that rumblings from Cuba are enough to inspire wartime type safety measures to guard the life of the President while on American soil—but within range of Fidel Castro.

I would hope, but not anticipate, that last week's panic button events would help diminish the paucity of awareness that symbolizes our attitude toward Cuba.

For a few hours our Government was apparently acknowledging what the American people have long realized: Communist Cuba is a menace to the safety and security of the United States and is a base from which can be launched everything from a war to a revolution to an assassination.

That the danger is genuine and ubiquitous is proven by the OAS report on Cuban aggression to which I alluded earlier in my remarks.

The investigating committee produced an impeccably documented indictment of the Castro regime, charging it principally with sending a large arms shipment into Venezuela for use by Communist guerrillas who hoped to upset free elections in that country.

Perhaps the most succinct summation of the nature of the new Cuba is in the report's conclusions:

The present Government of Cuba since its institution in 1959 has carried on, supported, and directed in various ways a policy of intervention in sabotage and guerrilla operations, and the supply of arms to support those movements that seek to subvert national institutions through force in order to install Communist regimes.

Apparently, Premier Castro has not heard his master's voice of late. Peaceful coexistence—enforced with bazookas, mortars, recoilless and automatic rifles, submachineguns, and plans for the conquest of Caracas by guerrillas—is the new theme of international communism.

Despite Khrushchev's recent penchant for peace, on his terms, no one supposes that Castro is going to roll over and play dead for the benefit of the OAS. Accordingly, we can only hope the U.S. leadership will contribute to an effective and positive policy when the na-

tions of the Americas meet to vote sanctions against Cuba.

Mr. President, I am not going to presume to edit the OAS document. I do feel, however, that with a meeting of the OAS tentatively scheduled for this month, it would be well if excerpts from the report were to find their way into the CONGRESSIONAL RECORD.

Accordingly, I would like to read into the RECORD the conclusions of the committee; portions of pages 1, 2, 3, 12, 14, 15, and 16; a section beginning on page 21 entitled "Campaign of Propaganda, Training of Venezuelans and Sending of Funds"; and "Some Definitions of Political Aggression," appearing on page 47.

In reading these into the RECORD, I am certainly not suggesting they form the only salient features of the report. The entire document has the tone of a well prepared legal brief. Great care is taken to substantiate statements and to avoid conjecture. The report is replete with full names, precise locations, exact times, and full details. It is a credit to the committee of nations which prepared it.

1. THE VENEZUELAN CHARGES

The Representative of Venezuela, Ambassador Enrique Tejera Paris, in a note dated November 29, 1963, requested the Chairman of the Council of the Organization of American States to convoke an immediate and urgent meeting of the Organ of Consultation under the terms of article 6 of the Inter-American Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance, "to consider measures that should be taken to deal with the acts of intervention and aggression on the part of the Cuban Government affecting the territorial integrity and the sovereignty of Venezuela, as well as the operation of its democratic institutions."

At a special meeting of the Council of the Organization of American States held on December 3, 1963, the representative of Venezuela stated the basis in fact and law invoked by his government in favor of the request for convocation of the Organ of Consultation. He referred, in particular, to the discovery by the authorities of his country on November 2, 1963, of "abundant war equipment hidden in a place called Macama on the seacoast of Falcon State," regarding which the Government of Venezuela had ample proof of Cuban origin and provenance. At that meeting the Council of the Organization, after hearing the statements made by several representatives, adopted a resolution—appendix 2—presented by the representative of Venezuela, by virtue of which it resolved:

First. To convoke the Organ of Consultation in accordance with the provisions of the Inter-American Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance, to meet on the date and at the place to be fixed in due time.

Second. To constitute itself and act provisionally as Organ of Consultation, in accordance with article 12 of the aforementioned treaty.

Third. To inform the Security Council of the United Nations of the text of this resolution.

Immediately thereafter, the Council of the Organization, acting provisionally as Organ of Consultation, held a meeting and approved a draft resolution, with a slight modification, presented by the representative of Venezuela. The text of the resolution adopted is as follows:

The Council of the Organization of American States, acting provisionally as Organ of Consultation,

Resolves (1) To authorize the Chairman of the Council of the Organization to appoint a committee to investigate and report on the acts denounced by Venezuela at the meeting of the Council held this morning; (2) to request the American governments and the Secretary General of the Organization to cooperate fully in facilitating the work of the committee, which will begin to function immediately after it is appointed.

Pursuant to the above resolution, the Chairman of the Council designated the following countries to compose the committee: Argentina, Colombia, Costa Rica, the United States, and Uruguay.

CONCLUSION

The committee concluded that Cuban arms were smuggled to Venezuela last fall.

I quote:

In formulating its conclusions, the committee considers it pertinent to make some general observations on the policy of intervention in the hemisphere of the present Government of Cuba, which has been substantiated in the investigation of the charges made by Venezuela:

1. The present Government of Cuba since its institution in 1959 has carried on, supported, and directed in various ways a policy of intervention in the hemisphere through propaganda methods, provisions of funds, training in sabotage and guerrilla operations, and the supply of arms to support those movements that seek to subvert national institutions through force in order to install Communist regimes.

2. This support of subversion, which generally takes the form of political aggression, has had positive application in the Republic of Venezuela, the primary objective in Cuba's policy of expansion and ideological penetration in the hemisphere, and its status as a democratic country where factors that motivated the present Government of Cuba to make use of the subversive action of organizations that employ force and violence to overthrow that democratic Government.

1. The Republic of Venezuela has been the target of a series of actions sponsored and directed by the Government of Cuba, openly intended to subvert Venezuelan institutions and to overthrow the democratic Government of Venezuela through terrorism, sabotage, assault, and guerrilla warfare.

2. A characteristic manifestation of this policy of aggression has been the systematic and hostile propaganda campaign carried out through information organs that are under the control of the Government of Cuba and that are directed against Venezuelan institutions, the President of the Republic, and other high Government officials, inciting the people of Venezuela to rebellion and, in addition, giving direct support to subversive movements.

3. Other manifestations of this policy of aggression are found in the supply of funds and the indoctrination and training in Cuba of numerous Venezuelans who later returned to their country to participate in subversive movements.

4. An important element in this intervention in Venezuela, directed by the Government of Cuba, was the shipment of arms that was found on the Peninsula of Paraguana in the State of Falcon on November 1, 1963, close to the date of the general elections. The shipment was made up of arms originating in Cuba that were surreptitiously landed at a solitary spot on the coast, for the purpose of being used in subversive operations to overthrow the constitutional Government of Venezuela.

OBSTRUCTIONS ON ARMS

With respect to this shipment, the following facts are noteworthy:

(a) The perforations and obstructions that were made on the various weapons in places where the Cuban coat of arms and other identification marks had been stamped, in an effort to hide their well-known Cuban origin.

(b) The conditioning and packing of the arms for immediate use, the quantity and quality of the arms, and the instructions for their use, which were found in the hands of Communist groups. These arms were to be used to support subversive activities and guerrilla action by organizations disciplined and trained for such purposes.

(c) The discovery, at the same spot where the shipment of arms was found, of a boat with an outboard motor, which motor was sent from Montreal, Canada, to Havana by air on October 1, 1963, for delivery to the National Institute of Agrarian Reform of Cuba, an official institution of that country.

5. The policy of aggression on the part of the Government of Cuba was confirmed by the discovery on November 4, 1963, by Venezuelan authorities, of a plan of operations, the "Caracas plan," prepared for the subversive action of the so-called Armed Forces of National Liberation. This plan anticipated the use of arms similar in type and numerical proportion to the shipment of arms mentioned in the preceding paragraph. The objective of the plan was to capture the city of Caracas, to prevent the holding of elections on December 1, 1963, and to seize control of the country.

6. Consequently, the acts of intervention that have been outlined, and, in particular, the shipment of arms, constitute a policy of aggression on the part of the present Government of Cuba against the territorial integrity, the political sovereignty, and the stability of the democratic institutions of Venezuela.

SCOPE OF THE ACCUSATION MADE BY VENEZUELA

The "acts of intervention and aggression" of which Venezuela accuses the present Government of Cuba should be studied as a whole. Radio and written propaganda, the trips of Venezuelans to Cuba to receive political indoctrination and practical instruction in sabotage, guerrilla techniques, and methods of subversion, together with the supplying of funds and armaments in appreciable quantities to accomplish these aims, cannot be considered as isolated, unconnected acts; on the contrary, they reflect a well calculated, thought-out design to extend communism in the hemisphere.

The scope of Venezuela's accusation, therefore, requires an examination of the following points:

First. The offensive of international communism in the Americas.

Second. The policy of the present Government of Cuba to encourage and support subversion in other American Re-

publics, in order to establish Marxist-Leninist governments.

Third. The priority that the present Government of Cuba accords to supporting armed insurrection in Venezuela, for the purpose of overthrowing the constitutional government of that country.

THE OFFENSIVE OF INTERNATIONAL COMMUNISM IN THE AMERICAS

On various occasions, at both Inter-American Conferences and Meetings of Consultation of Ministers of Foreign Affairs, the American Republics have denounced international communism's policy of aggression, carried out through satellite states, and have adopted resolutions to strengthen democratic government in the hemisphere against the threat of totalitarian ideologies.

The Ninth International Conference of American States, in 1948, declared:

That, by its antidemocratic nature and its interventionist tendency, the political activity of international communism or any other totalitarian doctrine is incompatible with the concept of American freedom, which rests upon two undeniable postulates: the dignity of man as an individual and the sovereignty of the nation as a state.

The Fourth Meeting of Consultation of Ministers of Foreign Affairs, in 1951, adopted two resolutions designed to seek inter-American cooperation in the battle against the subversive activities of international communism.

The 10th Inter-American Conference, in 1954, once more condemned the activities of the International Communist movement.

The same was done at the meetings of Foreign Ministers held at Santiago, Chile, in 1959; at San Jose, Costa Rica, in 1960 and at Punta del Este, Uruguay, in 1962.

With the "acts of intervention and aggression" denounced by Venezuela, it is now evident that in spite of the measures called for in the inter-American system, the danger of the spread of a totalitarian ideology in the hemisphere, imposed by means of force and violence, is now greater than ever. It would, of course, be up to the Organ of Consultation to deduce the consequences implicit in that situation. In this particular case, the committee found that the present Government of Cuba, a satellite of international communism, has been carrying out a policy of aggression that accentuates the threat of the sovereignty and political independence of the American Republics and vitiates their right to freely elect their rulers, in line with their own democratic institutions and their individual sovereign will.

The methods employed by the present Government of Cuba in Venezuela have consisted basically of support for movements aimed at the violent overthrow of the institutions of that Republic; organization of an intense propaganda campaign to promote anarchy; training individuals in guerrilla tactics and subversion; and furnishing money and arms for the accomplishment of these purposes.

THE POLICY OF THE PRESENT GOVERNMENT OF CUBA TO ENCOURAGE AND SUPPORT SUBVERSION IN ORDER TO ESTABLISH GOVERNMENTS OF THE MARXIST-LENINIST TYPE IN OTHER AMERICAN REPUBLICS

Virtually from the time the present Government of Cuba came to power, in 1959, that country has been converted into a true base for the promotion of subversion in other republics of the hemisphere.

The purpose of extending the Communist revolution to the remainder of the hemisphere has been publicly stated by the members of the present Government of Cuba and brought out also in connection with the invasions or attempted invasions of Panama and Haiti in the spring and summer of 1959, when the proselyting activities of that government had scarcely begun. Although the Government of Cuba denied its participation in those incidents, the factfinding investigating committees of the Council of the Organization of American States, acting provisionally as Organ of Consultation, and of the Inter-American Peace Committee identified those invasions as coming from Cuba and established the material support given to those who carried them out, and this was the reason for applying the Inter-American Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance.

CAMPAIGN OF PROPAGANDA, TRAINING OF VENEZUELAN, AND SENDING OF FUNDS

The chief manifestations of that policy of Cuba against Venezuela have consisted of the following:

First. A hostile and systematic campaign of propaganda against the Government of Venezuela, as well as incitement to and support of the Communist subversion that is being carried out in that country.

Second. Training, in all kinds of subversive activities, of numerous Venezuelan citizens, who traveled to Cuba for that purpose.

Third. Remittance of funds through these travelers and other channels, for the purpose of maintaining and increasing subversive activities, and

Fourth. The provision of arms to guerrilla and terrorist groups operating in Venezuela, as shown by the shipment of arms discovered on November 1, 1963, on the Paraguana Peninsula, and the plan for the capture of the city of Caracas, which will be discussed later.

As observed previously, and as the following will show, it is a question of a group of activities undertaken and carried out with a view to preparing the way in order to facilitate the success of Communist plans with regard to Venezuela, and this has been evidenced in the acts of intervention and aggression recently denounced by the government of that country.

With respect to the hostile and systematic propaganda carried on by the Cuban Government, President Betancourt referred in his statement to the insistent and continuing campaign on the part of the Cuban press and radio against the Venezuelan Government, stressing that in respect to Cuba, where

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a single party exists, and radio, press, and television are controlled by the Government, it was logical to impute responsibility to that Government for the "aggressive and violent campaign against the Venezuelan authorities and Nation." He also recalled that, during the military revolts in Puerto Cabello and Carupano, incitement to a general rebellion in Venezuela was constantly made from Cuba. The President also referred to the fact that, during the October crisis in 1962, when the installation of offensive nuclear weapons was discovered in Cuba, and as a result of Venezuela's participation in the action recommended by the Organization of American States, incitement from Cuba to acts of terrorism and sabotage in Venezuela was intensified.

By way of illustration, among the many manifestations of propaganda directed against Venezuela from Cuba, the following should be mentioned:

First, The programs transmitted almost daily by Radio Havana, intended for Venezuela, praising and stimulating terrorists and guerrilla activities organized by the so-called Armed Forces of National Liberation.

Second, The instructions heard regularly on Radio Havana, and the facilities given to leaders of the Venezuelan Communist Party—PCV—and the Revolutionary Leftist Movement—MIR—living in or traveling to Cuba to address the Venezuelan people over the aforementioned broadcasting station, inciting them to rebellion and exhorting them to support their revolutionary activities.

Third, The "Weeks of Solidarity with the Venezuelan Revolution" held in 1962 and 1963, during which Venezuelan leaders of the PCV and the MIR, as well as high Cuban Government officials, delivered speeches expressing solidarity with and support for the Venezuelan revolution, which were transmitted by radio and published in Cuban official newspapers and periodicals.

Fourth, The broadcasting by Radio Havana of bulletins, harangues, and exhortations to the Venezuelan people, by the so-called National Liberation Front and Armed Forces of National Liberation.

In regard to written propaganda, the Government of Venezuela has provided the committee with abundant documentation consisting of books, pamphlets, magazines, newspapers, and other publications of a subversive nature published in Cuba that were confiscated from persons belonging to terrorist groups, guerrillas, or persons arriving in Venezuela from Cuba. Included among the publications that were attached are works by Gen. Alberto Bayo and Maj. Ernesto Guevara on guerrilla warfare, both of which were published in Cuba.

The Venezuelan authorities have also placed ample information at the disposal of the committee, regarding frequent trips to Cuba by leaders and members of the Venezuelan Communist Party and the Revolutionary Leftist Movement for the purpose of participating in political meetings and gatherings hostile to the Venezuelan Government, and receiving instruction and training in sabotage tactics, guerrilla warfare, and other sub-

versive activities. These trips also served, according to information received from the Venezuelan authorities, for carrying funds intended for maintaining and increasing those activities in Venezuela and, likewise, as a means for taking subversive literature and propaganda published in Cuba into the country, as was verified by the material confiscated by the Venezuelan authorities, referred to above.

In regard to the foregoing, the declarations made before the Venezuelan authorities by some of the persons who traveled to Cuba are of particular interest. Among them, mention should be made, of that of Juan de Dios Marin, who was arrested by the authorities upon his return from Cuba by air, and who declared before the committee that he had received training in the use of arms and in guerrilla warfare, and that numerous Latin Americans were participating in that training, many of whom were Venezuelan members of the Venezuelan Communist Party and the Revolutionary Leftist Movement.

It is also pertinent to cite, by way of example, the case of the well-known political leader, Fabricio Ojeada, who declared before the Venezuelan authorities that he had made numerous trips to Cuba, and participated in the guerrilla activities that are carried on in the State of Lara, and that of Luis E. Sanchez Madero, who also traveled to Cuba in 1962 and returned surreptitiously to Caracas, where he was recently arrested because he was found to have documents containing plans for the occupation of the city of Caracas and instructions on the use of arms similar to those discovered on the Paraguana Peninsula on November 1, 1963.

SOME DEFINITIONS OF POLITICAL AGGRESSION

The concept of political aggression has been legally defined on various occasions.

In this respect, it should be recalled that at the San Francisco Conference, Bolivia proposed the following definition:

The intervention of a state in the domestic or foreign policy of another state.

On the same occasion, the Philippines proposed:

Interference in the internal affairs of another nation, through the furnishings of arms, munitions, funds, and other contributions to any faction, group, or armed band, or for the purpose of organizing propaganda affecting the security of this nation's institutions in its territory.

At the United Nations General Assembly on January 11, 1952, Bolivia insisted upon the following:

The undertaking of the part of a state to openly or clandestinely incite the people of another state to rebellion, with a view to disturbing public order in the interest of a foreign power.

The International Law Commission of the United Nations included the following in the Draft Code of Offenses Against the Peace and Security of Mankind:

5. The undertaking or encouragement by the authorities of a state of activities calculated to foment civil strife in another state.

6. The undertaking or encouragement by the authorities of a state of activities in another state, or the toleration by the authori-

ties of a state organized activities calculated to carry out terrorist acts in another state.

9. The intervention by the authorities of a state in the internal or external affairs of another state by means of coercive measures of an economic or political character, in order to force its will and obtain from it advantage of any kind.

With equal firmness, the Soviet Union proposed the following at the United Nations in 1953:

1. To promote subversive activities against a state (acts of terrorism, sabotage, and so forth).

2. To promote civil war in another state.

3. To abet insurrection in another state or political changes favorable to the aggressor.

These are merely documentations of what has happened. They consist mainly of the findings of the investigating committee appointed by the Organization of American States.

Mr. STENNIS. Mr. President, will the Senator yield?

Mr. SIMPSON. I yield.

Mr. STENNIS. I highly commend the Senator from Wyoming for his very timely presentation of very important facts, and wish to commend him for the way in which he has handled the entire subject. His approach has been sane, responsible, and commonsense. I am delighted that he has been doing as much work on the subject as he has. I know it will be of help to the Members of this body, the entire Congress, and the people of the United States.

We on the Preparedness Subcommittee have been wrestling with various phases of the subject for approximately a year.

I deeply appreciate the work that the speech of the Senator from Wyoming reflects. As I have said, I heartily congratulate him and wish to encourage him in every way I know to continue his pursuit of this highly important and somewhat neglected subject.

Mr. SIMPSON. Mr. President, I thank the distinguished Senator from Mississippi. I am not unmindful of the service he is rendering his country as chairman of the Preparedness Subcommittee.

Many Senators are trying to alert the American people to the awful confrontation that is being witnessed so close to our shores and the situation that now prevails in the Organization of American States. Unless the American people and the American Government come to grips with that very important problem, we may find ourselves in a most inextricable position.

Mr. STENNIS. I thank the Senator. He is entirely correct.

Mr. LAUSCHE. Mr. President, will the Senator yield?

Mr. SIMPSON. I yield to the Senator from Ohio.

Mr. LAUSCHE. I also wish to commend the Senator from Wyoming for his excellent and timely presentation of the threat that Cuba poses not only to the Western Hemisphere but particularly to our country because of the activities of Cubans everywhere. The Senator's presentation was effective, sound, and warns the people of our country about the increase of the menace of the pres-

ence of Castro and communism in our Western Hemisphere.

I should like to add one thought. In my opinion, Khrushchev cannot exercise his influence in many countries, and is thus using Castro to be his operator. We have only seen the beginning of this base of communism in the Western Hemisphere.

Recently we read that Cuban Communists were in Zanzibar. I think it will be found that where Khrushchev cannot get in, he will use Castro as his instrumentality for infiltration, sabotage, pushbutton precipitation of riots, and all the other techniques of the kind. We had better wake up.

I commend the Senator from Wyoming for his statement.

Mr. SIMPSON. I thank the Senator from Ohio. I want to say any observation the Senator from Ohio makes is usually very much to the point, as is this one. I agree wholeheartedly with what he has had to say. I think it must be patent to the American people that when our President goes on a political pilgrimage to Florida certain precautions have to be taken. The measures last week were prompted by a fear of some kind of strike from a country 90 miles from our shores. The precautions are, I hope, an indication that the administration is beginning to realize the dangerous situation created by Communist Cuba.

Mr. LAUSCHE. Mr. President, will the Senator yield further?

Mr. SIMPSON. I yield.

Mr. LAUSCHE. A few months ago we had a revelation of the trouble in the Dominican Republic, the incumbent government of which was overthrown. The proof showed that the incumbent government, led by Diaz, was tolerating, softly, Communist activities. In the first place Diaz had allowed the television station run by the Communists to be used for propaganda. In the second place, he had allowed them to use a school for the teaching of Communist techniques. Third, he had allowed the return of Communists who had been driven out of the Dominican Republic. Fourth, and finally, he had allowed Dominican Republic youths to go into Cuba, there to be indoctrinated, and then to move back into the Dominican Republic and other places to conduct the spread of communism.

Mr. SIMPSON. That spread goes unchecked.

Mr. LAUSCHE. It is going on now. It is the base of operations in the Western Hemisphere. Little Cuba is the convenient instrumentality of Khrushchev for getting into places which he could not get into with his mighty strength.

Mr. SIMPSON. I agree wholeheartedly. I call attention to the fact that our Government rushed in pell-mell to recognize Zanzibar, knowing full well it was a Communist-established government. These are the kinds of actions by which the Government loses prestige in the eyes of the American people and by which the prestige of the American Government is lost abroad.

The Senator brought to mind the situation that occurred in Panama, where

we built schools and then allowed the Russian Government to provide the textbooks.

These are matters of public knowledge and concern. I think the time is long past when we should begin to make a show of the strength of this country, which has never before given in to aggression, and which we hope never will. But I think we should bring into evidence the power and strength of America so we can recoup some of the image that we have lost throughout the world.

Mr. MILLER. Mr. President, will the Senator yield?

Mr. SIMPSON. I yield.

Mr. MILLER. I compliment the Senator from Wyoming for his fine statement. I want to let him know that, so far as I am concerned, when he speaks on the floor of the Senate he makes much sense, and is very timely in his observations.

In connection with the matter of Cuba, I wish to comment further on it by saying that I noticed in this morning's Washington Post, on page 2, an article entitled "Oil Quarantine of Cuba Would Be Scranton Aim."

The article refers to an interview, at Harrisburg, Pa., in which the question was asked of Governor Scranton what he would recommend with respect to Cuba.

The Governor replied:

Well, first of all, I think the main thing to do is to try and work with our allies to initiate a quarantine. If this is impossible, after a good deal of effort is made with our allies to do so, with the help of the OAS (Organization of American States) and Latin American States, take a further step, provided there is a continuance of the subversive activities emanating from Cuba.

Then the question was asked:

What kind of blockade? For instance, the quarantine of Russian oil shipments?

The answer was:

Yes.

The next question was:

Couldn't this mean the possible use of force?

The answer was:

It could.

The next question was:

Would you be willing to do that?

The answer was:

Yes. If we could not implement a quarantine.

I think the point that should be made is this. In view of the fact that many of us Republicans here in the Congress have been criticizing the failure to implement the policy on Cuba, or the failure to take action on Cuba, it probably would be helpful if all the candidates—announced or unannounced—and if the leadership of our party would henceforth make clear what they have in mind, just as Governor Scranton apparently did just yesterday, and as I believe one or two of the other candidates have already done.

We criticize this administration for making speeches about Cuba and deploring the situation in Cuba and telling the Cuban patriots that we look forward to the day when they will have freedom; but we do not do anything about it.

I do not think it is going to do our friends who are seeking the nomination in our party any good to dodge the question when they are asked, "What would you do on Cuba?" by saying, "We deplore the Cuban situation and are unhappy about it." I think they had better be responsive to the question and make their suggestions, as Governor Scranton and I think one or two of the other candidates have done. I hope they have set the pattern for others.

The Senator from Wyoming has consistently advocated implementing action on Cuba. In doing so, I think he reflects the views not only of a majority of the people of Wyoming but the people of our country.

Mr. SIMPSON. I thank the Senator from Iowa. I read the article to which the Senator has referred. The situation is that we have thrown up a "hot air" blockade around Cuba. We advise our allies and friends not to trade with Cuba, but we trade with countries who can and do transport goods to Cuba. This is the sort of policy which brings us into dispute all over the globe. Is there anyone so naive as to wonder why Cuba is attempting to sabotage Venezuela and overthrow the Government? Venezuela is the most oil rich country in South America and could provide fuel beyond measure for the Communist government. A main thrust of the Communist move in Latin America is against Venezuela because of that country's rich oil deposits.

Mr. MILLER. The Senator will recall that a year and a half ago several Members of the Senate, including particularly the Senator from New York [Mr. KEATING], were advocating action on Cuba. The Senator from Iowa, for example, has long suggested what he calls a war materiel blockade of Cuba, under which food, medicine, clothing, supplies, and even buses, would be permitted to go in and out of Cuba, but not one ounce of war materiel would be allowed to go into or out of Cuba. Our friends on the other side of the aisle started to scream, "warmonger." The Senator will recall how quickly they stopped their chattering about warmongering when the President of the United States put a blockade into effect.

Mr. SIMPSON. And that gave them an advantage in that it gave a picture and an image throughout the world of strength, which image we have since lost.

Mr. MILLER. I know we gave such an image to Latin America. Now, because of inability to follow through by inaction on Cuba, many Latin America countries are beginning to look upon the United States as a paper tiger. I just hope that by a continuation of the focusing of public attention on this situation, such as the Senator from Wyoming has been so ably doing, one of these days the administration will recognize the fact that the people want action.

They do not want war, but at the same time they want firmness to do something more than merely speak about the deplorable situation in Cuba.

I thank the Senator for yielding to me.

Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the article to which I have referred be printed in the Record.

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There being no objection, the article was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

OIL QUARANTINE OF CUBA WOULD BE SCRANTON AIM

(By Jack Bell)

HARRISBURG, Pa., March 2.—Gov. William W. Scranton proposed today the clamping of a strict quarantine on Communist Cuba, including, if necessary, the use of force to cut off Soviet oil shipments to Castro.

The Pennsylvania Governor, widely regarded as a potent possibility for the Republican Presidential nomination, also said in an interview that he doesn't want to become a presidential candidate and doesn't think that is necessary.

For the first time he said without qualification that he would reject any offer of the vice-presidential nomination, a goal for which Senator BARRY GOLDWATER, Republican, of Arizona, an avowed presidential candidate, said Scranton should be aiming.

Despite his disclaimer of any national ambitions, Scranton was willing to air his views on pressing foreign and domestic policy issues.

Asked what he thinks President Johnson's administration might be doing about Cuba that it isn't, he replied:

"Well, first of all, I think the main thing to do is to try and work with your allies to initiate a quarantine. If this is impossible, after a good deal of effort is made with our allies to do so, with the help of the OAS (Organization of American States) and Latin American states, take a further step, provided there is a continuance of the subversive activities emanating from Cuba, such as is going on in Nicaragua, Venezuela, and other Latin American countries, a form of blockade. This would mean a blockade if we could not effectuate a quarantine."

Question. What kind of blockade? For instance, the quarantine of Russian oil shipments?

Answer. Yes.

Question. Couldn't this mean the possible use of force?

Answer. It could.

Question. Would you be willing to do that?

Answer. Yes; if we could not implement a quarantine.

Scranton was asked how far he would go in meeting the Panamanian demands for revision of the canal treaty.

"I would like to know what the treaty says and then work out whatever arrangements seem right under the treaty itself," he said. "It is my understanding that the actual makeup of the treaty is such that there is some basis of concern as to what legally it means. Precisely what this is, I don't know."

Question. Would you accept the premise that we should at this time renegotiate the treaty?

Answer. No; I don't accept that premise. I said that I wanted to know what our present treaty says.

Asked if he would favor carrying the war in South Vietnam to the Communists in North Vietnam, the Governor replied:

"I haven't the slightest idea, nor does anybody else. I don't get all of the information coming out of southeast Asia, the intelligence reports from the CIA or the State Department or Defense. Until I knew precisely what the story is or precisely as I could get it from those reports, I would not indicate what kind of action to take. I say this—that we should do everything within our power and means to make sure that southeast Asia does not go totally Communist."

In answer to questions on domestic issues, Scranton said he opposes weakening the House-passed civil rights bill to gain Senate approval of the measure. If he faced the same conditions which confronted former

President Eisenhower and the late President Kennedy, he said he would have used troops to enforce Federal court orders.

Mr. DOMINICK. Mr. President, will the Senator yield?

Mr. SIMPSON. I am glad to yield.

Mr. DOMINICK. I rise to add my voice to those who have commented on the speech which the Senator from Wyoming has just made. We must keep this question alive all the time. Many of us are too prone to say, "Let someone else take care of it." We do have a policy situation running through not only the Cuban situation but a great many other facets of the foreign relations problem as well.

I was interested to listen to the comments of the Senator from Wyoming on the Zanzibar problem. I do not know whether the Senator saw the excerpt, but the other day Representative KATHARINE ST. GEORGE placed a short excerpt in the CONGRESSIONAL RECORD on the Zanzibar problem.

In that area, Mr. President, our people were not only imprisoned by those who took over the Government of Zanzibar led by two Cuban Communists, Cuban-trained and apparently native Cubans, but also within the matter of a few hours they hanged all the opposition and even put out a radio report asking one member of the previous government to come in so that he could be hanged more readily without having to be captured first. They then expelled the American political personnel from Zanzibar and within a matter of 5 days, as I recall, the American Government, as a reward to Zanzibar for its treatment of our own people, recognized the new Government.

Mr. SIMPSON. The Senator is correct, according to the RECORD.

Mr. DOMINICK. I cannot understand how we can expect to gain any respect whatsoever for the position of our foreign policy if we take actions of this kind. It seems incomprehensible to me.

Has the Senator from Wyoming any further knowledge on the Zanzibar problem of why we did this? I happen to know that within the administration itself there was disagreement on whether we should or should not recognize Zanzibar. I happened to be at a meeting where one of the representatives of the administration was strongly against it; but, apparently, he was overruled by the White House itself.

Mr. SIMPSON. I have no information other than does the Senator from Colorado.

I am not unmindful of the great contribution the Senator from Colorado has made to this question. I refer especially to the marvelous speech on national security which he made before the Air War College, which was broadcast all over America by a noted commentator who departed from his ordinary type of broadcast in order to make it available to the American people. I compliment the Senator from Colorado on his contribution. We must continue to bring the question of Cuba before the American people until firm action is taken, as was pointed out just now by the Senator from Iowa [Mr. MILLER]. This must be done

not only by Senators on this side of the aisle but certainly by Senators on the other side of the aisle. The Government must not continue to sweep this type of problem under the rug. It is vital for the future and safety of the American Republic.

Mr. DOMINICK. I completely agree with the distinguished Senator from Wyoming.

Mr. ALLOTT. Mr. President, will the Senator from Wyoming yield?

Mr. SIMPSON. I yield.

Mr. ALLOTT. I wish to join other Senators in paying tribute to the Senator from Wyoming for the remarks he has just made.

Looking back over the past year, I recall that not only the Senator from New York but the senior Senator from South Dakota, the two Senators from Nebraska, the Senator from Kentucky [Mr. MORTON], the Senator from Kansas [Mr. PEARSON], and my distinguished colleague, as well as myself, went to great efforts to study this question in an attempt to bring to the attention of the State Department the seriousness of the Cuban situation.

However, not only were all the suggestions ignored, but the State Department never at any time, by any act as much as the stroke of a pen, admitted that anything had ever been suggested on what we might do in Cuba.

I should like to propound this question, in the light of the remarks of the Senator from Wyoming, and in the light of history today.

If the Senator from Wyoming were a member of a Latin American country—and it would not make much difference which one, whether it was Chile, Bolivia, Brazil, or some other country—which is a member of the OAS, as 21 states there are, and he had seen the Cuban-led and inspired insurrection in Zanzibar, with the consequent humiliating deposing of American Embassy personnel in Zanzibar, and then later, within a few days, saw the American Government recognize that new government in Zanzibar, at the same time telling the people of the 21 American states in the OAS that we must be firm in fighting communism and in circumscribing the terrible Cuban menace, can the Senator imagine or put into words how, as a member of a Latin American country, he would feel toward the United States?

Mr. SIMPSON. That is quite a hypothetical question, but I believe my feeling would be that they were playing ball with a strawman.

Mr. ALLOTT. I am sure the State Department feels that way. It was a hypothetical question, but this is exactly how those people look at it, they cannot understand how we can do this sort of thing—all of the things that I mentioned in my question, and it was a long one—and then how can we turn around and call on them for support to contain Cuba and destroy this thing which is called Castro communism.

Mr. SIMPSON. I know the Senator is aware of the need for a show of firmness and determination by the Government. I invite the attention of Senators to this fact, that it was fewer than 20 Cubans who triggered the revolution and

change of government in Zanzibar. Yet with all the power and force of the United States, there was nothing we could do to prevent the Communist-oriented coup.

Mr. ALLOTT. I am glad the Senator used the words "nothing that we do," because there is plenty that we could do if we would just act; although this is most unpopular with the so-called intellectuals in our Government today, we should assert a little of the big-stick policy that Teddy Roosevelt utilized so effectively. I believe it is proper to comment at this point that while General de Gaulle is on the blacklist of most Americans, and we disapprove of the things which he has done, personally, and I hope to explore the subject at some depth on the floor of the Senate one of these days, all of the acts of De Gaulle including the recognition of Red China, in my opinion, are completely logical if viewed from the viewpoint of a Frenchman or to be particular from the viewpoint of General de Gaulle himself, they may not be logical from our viewpoint, but I must say I at least applaud the actions of De Gaulle when he took the little revolution, the coup d'etat in Gabon a few days ago and wrapped it up and washed it up within 48 hours. I wish we had such a will to do such things in this country.

Mr. SIMPSON. I doubt we would have such a will with the bright young men still in the administration who seem to be committed to a policy of appeasement. I invite the attention of the Senator from Colorado to the fact that I addressed myself to the situation with respect to President de Gaulle at the time he recognized Red China and I made the same observation that the Senator from Colorado has just made.

Mr. President, I yield the floor.

AGRICULTURAL ACT OF 1964—THE COTTON AND WHEAT PROGRAM

The Senate resumed the consideration of the bill (H.R. 6196) to encourage increased consumption of cotton (and wheat) to maintain the income of cotton producers to provide a special research program designed to lower costs of production, and for other purposes.

Mr. ELLENDER. Mr. President, I send an amendment to the desk and ask that it be stated.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The amendment will be stated.

The LEGISLATIVE CLERK. Beginning with page 13, line 24, it is proposed to strike out all through page 17, line 2, as follows:

(1) The following new section is added to the Act:

"Sec. 349. (a) The acreage allotment established under the provisions of section 344 of this Act for each farm for the 1964 crop may be supplemented by the Secretary by an acreage equal to such percentage, but not more than 10 per centum, of such acreage allotment as he determines will not increase the carryover of upland cotton at the beginning of the marketing year for the next succeeding crop above one million bales less than the carryover on the same date one year earlier, if the carryover on such earlier date exceeds eight million bales. For the 1965, 1966, and 1967 crops, the Secretary may, after such hearing and investigation as he finds

necessary, announce an export market acreage which he finds will not increase the carryover of upland cotton at the beginning of the marketing year for the next succeeding crop above one million bales less than the carryover on the same date one year earlier, if the carryover on such earlier date exceeds eight million bales. Such export market acreage shall be apportioned to the States on the basis of the State acreage allotments established under section 344 and apportioned by the States to farms receiving allotments under section 344, pursuant to regulations issued by the Secretary, after considering applications for such acreage filed with the county committee of the county in which the farm is located. The 'export market acreage' on any farm shall be the number of acres not exceeding the maximum export market acreage for the farm established pursuant to this subsection, by which the acreage planted to cotton on the farm exceeds the farm acreage allotment. For purposes of sections 345 and 374 of this Act and the provisions of any law requiring compliance with a farm acreage allotment as a condition of eligibility for price support or payments under any farm program, the farm acreage allotment for farms with export market acreage shall be the sum of the farm acreage allotment established under section 344 and the maximum export market acreage. Export market acreage shall be in addition to the county, State, and National acreage allotments and shall not be taken into account in establishing future State, county, and farm acreage allotments. The provisions of this section shall not apply to extra-long-staple cotton or to any farm which receives price support under section 103(b) of the Agricultural Act of 1949, as amended.

"(b) The producers on any farm on which there is export market acreage or the purchasers of cotton produced thereon shall, under regulations issued by the Secretary, furnish a bond or other undertaking prescribed by the Secretary providing for the exportation, without benefit of any Government cotton export subsidy and within such period of time as the Secretary may specify, of a quantity of cotton produced on the farm equal to the average yield for the farm multiplied by the export market acreage as determined pursuant to regulations issued by the Secretary. The bond or other undertaking given pursuant to this section shall provide that, upon failure to comply with the terms and conditions thereof, the person furnishing such bond or other undertaking shall be liable for liquidated damages in an amount which the Secretary determines and specifies in such undertaking will approximate the amount payable on excess cotton under section 346(a). The Secretary may, in lieu of the furnishing of a bond or other undertaking, provide for the payment of an amount equal to that which would be payable as liquidated damages under such bond or other undertaking. If such bond or other undertaking is not furnished, or if payment in lieu thereof is not made as provided herein, at such time and in the manner required by regulations of the Secretary, or if the acreage planted to cotton on the farm exceeds the farm acreage allotment established under the provisions of section 344 by more than the maximum export market acreage, the farm acreage allotment shall be the acreage so established under section 344. Amounts collected by the Secretary under this section shall be remitted to the Commodity Credit Corporation and used by the Corporation to defray costs of encouraging export sales of cotton under section 203 of the Agricultural Act of 1956, as amended."

(2) Section 376 of the Act is amended by adding at the end thereof the following: "This section also shall be applicable to liquidated damages provided for pursuant to section 349 of this title."

Redesignate succeeding subsections accordingly.

Mr. ELLENDER. Mr. President, I ask for the yeas and nays on my amendment.

The yeas and nays were ordered.

Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, I should like to inquire of the distinguished Senator from Louisiana, the chairman of the Committee on Agriculture and Forestry, how long he expects to speak on his amendment, on which yeas and nays have been ordered. I ask the question so that Senators may be informed that there will be a further vote today. I should like to know how long the Senator will take to explain his amendment.

Mr. ELLENDER. If Senators will remain in the Chamber, I can conclude my statement in 6 minutes.

Mr. MANSFIELD. In view of the Senator's statement, I hope the Senators will remain in the Chamber for a while, so that there may be some more votes.

ORDER FOR RECESS UNTIL 11 A.M. TOMORROW

Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that when the Senate completes its business today, it stand in recess until 11 o'clock tomorrow morning.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

AGRICULTURAL ACT OF 1964—THE COTTON AND WHEAT PROGRAM

The Senate resumed the consideration of the bill (H.R. 6196) to encourage increased consumption of cotton (and wheat) to maintain the income of cotton producers to provide a special research program designed to lower costs of production, and for other purposes.

ORDER OF BUSINESS

Mr. MANSFIELD. For the information of the Senate, because many Senators have asked about committee meetings for the remainder of the week, I should like to say that it is the intention of the leadership, barring unforeseen developments, to have the Senate convene at 11 o'clock tomorrow and for the remainder of the week, and that the order previously entered that the Senate meet at 10 o'clock tomorrow be rescinded.

Mr. ALLOTT. Mr. President, will the Senator yield?

Mr. MANSFIELD. I yield.

Mr. ALLOTT. Did I correctly understand the Senator to say that there was an agreement to meet at 10 o'clock tomorrow? I thought he had just asked unanimous consent that the Senate meet at 11 o'clock tomorrow.

Mr. MANSFIELD. Yesterday, after consulting with the distinguished minority leader, we thought it advisable to have the Senate meet at 10 o'clock tomorrow, Wednesday. However, unanimous consent has just now been granted that the Senate meet at 11 o'clock tomorrow and that the previous order be rescinded. It is anticipated that the Senate will meet at 11 o'clock for the remainder of the week.